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READING TEA LEAVES IN FEDERAL ELECTION

COMMISSION V. WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE:
HOPE FOR A BUCKLEY EVOLUTION?
Michael Anthony Lawrence*
During its 2006-2007 Term the United States Supreme Court decided yet another
in a long line of cases sprouting from the seminal 1976 First Amendment campaign
finance case, Buckley v. Valeo.1 In FederalElection Commission v. Wisconsin Right to
Life, Inc., 2 the Court concluded that § 203 of the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA or McCain-Feingold Act), 3 prohibiting the use of corporate funds to
finance "electioneering communications" during a specified pre-election period,4
constituted an as-applied violation of a non-profit corporation's free speech rights.
Wisconsin Right to Life offers useful insights into the Roberts Court's thinking on
the lively question of the propriety of legislative efforts to regulate the financing of
political campaigns. 5 On one hand the case demonstrates a Court properly skeptical of
laws proscribing constitutionally-protected individual rights (here freedom of
expression); on the other, a focused parsing of the principal, concurring, and dissenting
opinions uncovers the potential for a coalition of Justices able to undertake the necessary
work of evolving Buckley into a constitutional regime equipped to meaningfully address
the especially invidious aspects of Big Money in modern politics.
This essay offers a few thoughts on both themes.
I.

THE CASE: A PROPERLY SKEPTICAL COURT

In following its time-honored principle that "[w]here the First Amendment is
implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor," 6 the Supreme Court in Wisconsin
Right to Life reaffirms once again a robust First Amendment jurisprudence which serves

* Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. The author would like to thank MSU College of
Law Research Librarian Kathy Prince for her able research assistance.
1. 424 U.S. I (1976) (percuriam).
2. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) [hereinafter Wis. Right to Life 111].
3. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2000) (enacted under Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 91 (2002)).
4. "Electioneering communication" includes "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers
to a candidate for federal office and that is aired within 30 days of a federal primary election or 60 days of a
federal general election in the jurisdiction in which that candidate is running for office." 127 S.Ct. at 2660
(citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2000)).
5. During the previous Term (2005-2006), the newly-constituted Roberts Court decided Randall v.
Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006), striking down portions of a state law imposing strict limits on campaign
spending and contributions for state office.
6. Wis. Right to Life III, 127 S.Ct. at 2669.
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properly reconciles Government's interests with the
as a model for how the Constitution
7
protection of individual liberty.
This case involved the non-profit ideological advocacy corporation Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL). During the months leading up to the 2004 federal primary
election, Wisconsin allocated a portion of its general treasury funds to run three separate
broadcast advertisements. These advertisements urged voters to contact Wisconsin
Senators Russ Feingold and Herb Kohl (one of whom, Feingold, was up for reelection)
to tell them not to support a Senate filibuster designed to block a number of President
George W. Bush's federal judicial nominees. 8 Recognizing the broad applicability of §
203's "electioneering activities" definition to the three ads, as the 30-day pre-election
blackout neared, WRTL sued in federal district court for preliminary injunctive and
declaratory relief.9 The federal district court denied WRTL's request, stating, "the
leaves no room for the kind of 'as applied' challenge
reasoning of the McConnell Court
10
WRTL propounds before us."
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, stating, "[i]n upholding § 203 against
a facial challenge, we did not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges."'' On
remand, after first finding the case justiciable under the "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" mootness exception,

12

the district court held on the merits that § 203

did in fact constitute an as-applied violation of WRTL's constitutionally-protected

speech rights. 13 Reasoning that "the ads were not express advocacy or its functional
equivalent, but instead genuine 'issue ads,"''14 the district court "held that no compelling
interest justified BCRA's regulation of genuine issue ads such as those WRTL sought to
15

run.

7. See id. Anytime government seeks to proscribe individual liberty it must have an extremely good
("compelling") reason for doing so; and, in those instances where such an extremely good reason exists, the
means selected by the government must be as limited ("narrowly tailored") as possible. Under First
Amendment doctrine it is exceedingly rare for speech to be prohibited outright; to the extent it may be
regulated at all, speech may be subject only to "reasonable time, place and manner" limitations.
I suggest elsewhere that the Court's "reasonable time, place, and manner" approach should be extended
beyond the First Amendment to apply anytime government potentially limits individual liberty (broadly
interpreted). See generally Michael Anthony Lawrence, Government as Liberty's Servant: The "Reasonable
Time, Place and Manner" Standard of Review for All Government Restrictions on Liberty Interests, 68 La. L.
Rev. 1, 35-60 (2007).
8. See Wis. Right to Life 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2660-61.
9. Id.at2661.
10. Id. (citation omitted). A bit of background is in order. A year after Congress enacted the BCRA, the
Supreme Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 204-05 (2003), considered
"whether § 203 was facially overbroad under the First Amendment because it captured within its reach not only
campaign speech, or 'express advocacy,' but also speech about public issues more generally, or 'issue
127 S.Ct. at 2659 (citing
advocacy,' that mentions a candidate for federal office." Wis. Right to Life 111,
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204-05). In McConnell, the Court rejected a facial challenge to § 203, concluding,
"there was no overbreadth concern to the extent the speech in question was the 'functional equivalent' of
express campaign speech." ld.(citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206).
11. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed.Election Commn., 546 U.S. 410, 411-12 (2006) (per curiam) [hereinafter
Wis. Right to Life I]. This decision arose from the same litigation as Wisconsin Right to Life 11.
12. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Commn., 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 203 (D.D.C. 2006) [hereinafter
Wis. Right to Life 11].
13. Id. at 210.
466 F. Supp.
127 S.Ct. at 2662 (emphasis omitted) (citing Wis. Right to Life 11,
14. Wis. Right to Life 111,
2d at 205-08).
15. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/5
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In the instant case, Wisconsin Right to Life, the Supreme Court affirmed with a
majority on the justiciability question, but only a plurality on the merits. Chief Justice
Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion joined in all four
parts by Justice Alito, who also filed a short concurring opinion. Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas joined parts I and II, which dealt with factual/procedural
background and the justiciability question, but declined to join parts III and IV on the
merits, instead writing a concurring opinion in which they recommended overruling
McConnell. Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Accordingly, while five Justices agreed on the merits that § 203 was unconstitutional, at
least as-applied, they were split two and three on the rationale for that conclusion. Six
Justices, the four dissenters together with the Chief Justice and Justice Alito, voted to
uphold McConnell.] 6
In the principal opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, 17 lays out
the following rigorous test: "[A]n ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy
[and may thus be restricted] only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." 18 Explaining that
"[t]his Court has never recognized a compelling interest in regulating ads ...that are
neither express advocacy nor its functional equivalent," 19 the principal opinion
concludes, "[b]ecause WRTL's ads may reasonably be interpreted as something other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate, we hold they are not the
functional equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore fall outside the scope of
McConnell's holding." 20 Moreover, "[blecause [the government] ... identiflies] no
interest sufficiently compelling to justify burdening WRTL's speech, we hold that
BCRA § 203 is unconstitutional as applied to WRTL's [three] ads." 21 Further,
"[e]nough is enough.
Issue ads like WRTL's are by no means equivalent to
22
contributions, and the quid-pro-quo corruption interest cannot justify regulating them."
The concurrence by Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, first

16. It should be noted that Justice Alito is tenuous on this point, stating in his one-paragraph concurrence:

Ijoin the principal opinion because I conclude.., it is unnecessary to go further and decide whether
§ 203 is unconstitutional on its face. If it turns out that the implementation of the as-applied
standard set out in the principal opinion impermissibly chills political speech, we will presumably
be asked to reconsider the holding in McConnell v. FederalElection Commn. that § 203 is facially
constitutional.
Wis. Right to Life 11, 127 S.Ct. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
17. As for the "jurisprudential mystery why the two newest Justices [Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito,] did not simply sign on to Justice Scalia's opinion, which would have overturned McConnell," since,

"[t]hey likely predicted that their test would lead to the end of effective limits on corporate and union electionrelated spending from general treasuries," one commentator suggests "[t]he answer to the mystery is political,
not jurisprudential. Having promised moderation and incrementalism, Chief Justice Roberts apparently did not
want to pay a political cost for appearing to move too quickly to overturn precedent." Richard L. Hasen,
Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court'sDeregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 Minn. L.

Rev. - (forthcoming 2008) (available on SSRN). See infra nn. 63-64 and accompanying text for an
alternative suggestion that there may indeed be important jurisprudential bases for the different opinion.
18. Wis. Right to Life Ill,
127 S. Ct. at 2667.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 2671.
Id. at 2670.
Id. at 2673.
Id at 2672.
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recalls the Buckley Court's consideration of the relevant issues:
The [Buckley] Court began with the recognition that contributing money to, and spending
money on behalf of, political candidates implicates core First Amendment protections, and
that restrictions on such contributions and expenditures "operate in an area of the most
fundamental First Amendment activities." The Court also recognized, however, that the
Government has a compelling interest in "prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption." The "corruption" to which the Court repeatedly referred was of the "quid quo
entity makes a contribution or expenditure in
pro" variety, whereby an individual or
23
exchange for some action by an official.

Justice Scalia suggests the Court later took a wrong turn in Austin v. Michigan
State Chamberof Commerce24 in recognizing an entirely new class of corruption beyond
that of quid quo pro variety-i.e., "'the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas." ' 25 In addition, McConnell used "Austin's flawed rationale... [in concluding]

the compelling governmental interest that supported restrictions on corporate
expenditures for express advocacy also justified the extension of those restrictions to
'electioneering communications,' the 'vast majority' of which were intended to influence
elections. '

26

Justice Scalia thus asserts that McConnell was incorrectly decided, at least

with respect to § 203, and that McConnell should be reversed and § 203 struck down on
its face, perhaps to reinstate the prior-existing law covering "only expenditures ... that

or defeat of a candidate (in campaign-finance speak, soexpressly advocated the election
27
advocacy')."
'express
called
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
focuses on three areas in objecting to the plurality's holding:
[T]he demand for campaign money in huge amounts from large contributors, whose power
has produced a cynical electorate; the congressional recognition of the ensuing threat to
democratic integrity as reflected in a century of legislation restricting the electoral leverage
of concentrations of money in corporate and union treasuries; and McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, declaring the facial validity of the most recent Act of2 8Congress in
today.
that tradition, a decision that is effectively, and unjustifiably, overruled
Regarding the first, the dissent suggests the staggering increases in amounts spent
in recent years-where in the 2005-2006 election cycle, for example, "the
campaigns
on
expenditure of more than $2 billion on television shattered the previous record, even

23.

Wis. Right to Life Ill, 127 S. Ct. at 2676 (Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (quoting Buckley,

424 U.S. at 14, 25, 26, 27, 45, 47).
24. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
25. Wis. Right to Life 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2678 (Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (quoting Austin,

494 U.S. at 660).
26. Id. at 2679 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206).
27. Id. at 2675 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204) (and adding, "McConnell was mistaken in its belief,"
moreover, "that as-applied challenges could eliminate the unconstitutional applications of § 203.... The
promise of an administrable as-applied rule that is both effective in the vindication of First Amendment rights
and consistent with McConnell's holding is illusory." Id. at 2684; id. at 2685).
28. Wis. Right to Life 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2687 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citation
omitted). The dissent agreed with the majority that the case was justiciable. Id. at n. 1.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/5
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without a presidential contest"29-has led to alarmingly widespread cynicism among
ordinary Americans who recognize that "[t]he indispensable ingredient of a political
30
candidacy" is not so much good ideas as, rather, lots of "money for advertising."
On the second point, the dissent suggests the Court fails to give proper deference
to Congress's century-long efforts to address the problems in campaign finance. Spurred
initially in 1904 by President Theodore Roosevelt, who "invoked the power 'to protect
the integrity of the elections of its own officials [as] inherent' in government, and called
for 'vigorous measures to eradicate' perceived political corruption, for he found 'no
enemy of free government more dangerous and none so insidious."' 3 1 Congress
thereafter passed numerous pieces of legislation over the years in "a series of reactions to
documented threats to electoral integrity obvious to any voter, posed by large sums of
money from corporate or union treasuries." 32 Moreover, the dissent continues,
[n]either Congress's decisions nor our own have understood the corrupting influence of
money in politics as being limited to outright bribery or discrete quid pro quo; campaign
finance reform has instead consistently focused on the more pervasive distortion of
electoral institutions by concentrated wealth, on the special access and guaranteed favor
that sap the representative integrity of American government and defy public confidence in
its institutions. From early in the 20th century through the decision in McConnell, we have
acknowledged that the value of democratic integrity justifies a realistic response when
corporations and labor organizations commit the concentrated moneys in their treasuries to
33
electioneering.
Third, the dissent argues the principal opinion's "'susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate'
standard effectively (and inappropriately) overrules McConnell.34
Justice Souter
suggests,
[t]he price of McConnell's demise as authority on § 203 seems to me to be a high one. The
Court (and, I think, the country) loses when important precedent is overruled without good
reason, and there is no justification for departing from our usual rule of stare decisis
here.... Nothing in the related law surrounding § 203 has changed in any way, let alone
in any way that undermines McConnell's rationale.

Finally, it goes without saying that nothing has changed about the facts. In Justice
Frankfurter's words, they demonstrate a threat to "the integrity of our electoral process,"
which for a century now Congress has repeatedly found to be imperiled by corporate, and
later union, money... McConnell was our latest decision vindicating clear and reasonable
boundaries that Congress has drawn to limit "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth," and the decision could claim the justification of ongoing
fact as well as decisional history in recognizing Congress's authority to protect the

29. Id. at 2688.
30. Id. at 2687.
31. Id. at 2689 (citing 39 Cong. Rec. 17 (1904)).
32. Wis. Right to Life Ii, 127 S. Ct. at 2697.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 2699 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2655 (majority)).
Published
by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007
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35
integrity of elections from the distortion of corporate and union funds.

The effect of the plurality's holding, the dissent concludes, will be to undermine other
legitimate limits on campaign contributions, "now that companies and unions can save
candidates the expense of advertising directly, simply by running 'issue ads' without
express advocacy, or by funneling the money through an independent corporation like
36
WRTL."

II.

BUCKLEY EVOLUTION: SAVING OUR DEMOCRACY FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT

37

While Justice Roberts' and Alito's primary opinion in Wisconsin Right to Life is
laudable in imposing an appropriately highly-speech-protective standard for reviewing
38
as-applied challenges to BCRA § 203, it is instead the dissenting opinion of Justices
Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer that captures the case's potentially more lasting
message-that Buckley needs to evolve in order to reflect the realities of campaign
finance in the twenty-first century:
[T]he understanding of the voters and the Congress that this kind of... [campaign]
spending seriously jeopardizes the integrity of democratic government will remain. The
facts are too powerful to be ignored, and further efforts at campaign finance reform will
come. It is only the legal landscape that now is altered, and it may be that today's
departure from precedent will drive further reexamination of the constitutional analysis: of
the distinction between contributions and expenditures, or the relation between spending
39
itself was decided.
and speech, which have given structure to our thinking since Buckley
This section suggests the Supreme Court should recognize a compelling
and
government interest in protecting our democratic institutions from the "corrosive
4
0
process.
electoral
the
on
wealth"
of
distorting effects of immense aggregations
A.

The Scope of the Problem
As one critic has described the situation:
Buckley. . . leaves us in the worst of all possible worlds. A world where candidates are
constantly clamoring for, and willing to compromise for, the next dollar. A world where
candidates spend more time raising money than attending to government business or
constituent needs. A world where monied interests are entitled to drown out everyone
else's speech. A world where the wealthy--or their friends-have a special claim to
public office. A world where a politician's cash constituency claims more of his attention

at 2704-05 (citations omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2705.
37. With a nod to my Michigan State College of Law colleague Kevin Saunders, who makes a convincing
case for the need to protect an especially vulnerable segment of our population-children-from unfettered
speech in his book Saving our Children from the First Amendment, we similarly need to protect another
vulnerable body-our very democracy-from the negative effects resulting from overzealous enforcement of
the First Amendment. See Kevin W. Saunders, Saving our Childrenfrom the FirstAmendment (N.Y. U. Press
2003).
38. "[A]n ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy [and may thus be restricted] only if the ad is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate."
127 S. Ct. at 2667.
39. Id. at 2705 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
40. Austin, 494 U.S. at660.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/5
6

2008]

HOPEFOR A BUCKLEY EVOLUTION?

Lawrence: Reading Tea Leaves in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Ri

and allegiance than his voting constituency. A world where superb candidates do not run,
whether because they are sick to their stomachs about the money chase or because they are
dismissed as not viable without mega-wealth or a Midas touch. A world in which every
reform worth
adopting is weakened from the start by constitutionally mandated
41
loopholes.
This passage expresses well the depth of the pervasive cynicism of many
Americans. The dissenters in Wisconsin Right to Life discuss the problem at some length
as well:
[The need for political candidates to raise massive sums of money] has two significant
consequences for American Government... . The enormous demands [for money], first,
What the high-dollar ... [donors] get is special access
assign power to deep pockets ....
to the officials they help elect, and with it a disproportionate influence on those in power.
As the erstwhile officer of a large American corporation put it, "'[b]usiness leaders
believe-based on experience and with good reason-that ... access gives them an
opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so
derives from the fact that they have given large sums of money to the parties."' At a
critical level, contributions that underwrite elections are leverage for enormous political
influence.
Voters know this. Hence, the second important consequence of the demand for big money
to finance publicity: pervasive public cynicism. A 2002 poll found that 71 percent of
Americans think Members of Congress cast votes based on the views of their big
contributors, even when those views differ from the Member's own beliefs about what is
best for the country. ("In public opinion research it is uncommon to have 70 percent or
more of the public see an issue the same way. When they do, it indicates an unusually
strong agreement on that issue[.]").... [O]nly a quarter think Members often base their
votes on perceptions of what is best for the country or their constituents.
Devoting concentrations of money in self-interested hands to the support of political
campaigning therefore threatens the capacity of this democracy to represent its
constituents and the confidence of its citizens in their capacity to govern themselves. These
up in the notion of political integrity, giving it a value second to
are the elements summed
42
none in a free society.

41. If Buckley Fell 3 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., Century Found. Press 1999). See also Blasi, How
Campaign Spending Limits Can Be Reconciled with the First Amendment, 7 Responsive Community 1, 5-6

(1996-1997) (stating, more than ever before, "challengers and incumbents alike must beat the bushes--day
after day, week after week, year after year ....
This is a terrible way for representatives and would-be
representatives to be spending their time"); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter:A Constitutional
Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1204 (1994) (suggesting the Court's Buckley approach
gives inadequate consideration to the skewing effects of money in political campaigns in allowing the wealthy
to have more influence).
42. Wis. Right to Life 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2688-89 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). Further,
[wlith respect to judicial elections, a context in which the influence of campaign contributions is
most troubling, a recent poll of business leaders revealed that about four in five thought that
campaign contributions have at least "some influence" on judges' decisions, while 90 percent are at
least "somewhat concerned" that "[c]ampaign contributions and political pressure will make judges
accountable to politicians and special interest groups instead of the law and the Constitution."
Id.
at
2688by
n. 2TU
(citations
omitted).Commons, 2007
Published
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What can be done? Within our current First Amendment framework, how might
we address these deep concerns without gutting the amendment's vital protections of
speech? As noted previously, the Court's First Amendment doctrine is properly highly
protective of speech. 4 3 Even within the most highly-protected realm of speechpolitical speech-the right to speak is not absolute, however. The First Amendment does
not protect the right to drive through neighborhoods in a sound truck broadcasting
loudly-amplified political messages, for example; 44 or to engage in political protest of
government policy by sleeping in tents near the White House; 45 or to hold large political
gatherings when, for example, "the intended use would present an unreasonable danger
' 6
to the health or safety of park users. A
Similarly, the right to engage in political speech by spending money on political
campaigns need not be as absolute as Buckley seems to suggest. If there are compelling
reasons for regulating (but never silencing outright) campaign finance speech, First
Amendment doctrine comfortably allows narrowly-tailored rules. We can uphold
Buckley's central premise that spending money in campaigns is constitutionallyprotected political speech, yet recognize also a compelling interest in eliminating the
"corruption" of the process caused by "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated ... [from a variety of sources] that have
' 47
little or no correlation to the public's support for ... [those sources'] political ideas.
In our democracy, maintaining openness and fairness of the electoral process by
protecting against the skewing effects of Big Money can certainly qualify as a
compelling interest, as can similar measures taken to guarantee the effective functioning
of other democratic institutions: "[C]andidates enter campaigns the way trial participants
enter a courtroom, officials enter a legislative hall, or witnesses appear before an agency
hearing. ' ' One commentator suggests, "Their speech can be legally restricted.., by
' 49
rules that further the proper functioning of the particular institution.
B.

Reading Tea Leaves in Wisconsin Right to Life
A parsing of the three opinions in Wisconsin Right to Life suggests there may be

43. See supra n. 7.
44. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
45. Clark v. Communityfor CreativeNon-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
46. Thomas v. ChicagoPark Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002).
47. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. See also supra n. 25 and accompanying text.
48. C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 Har. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 1, 46
(1998).
49. Id. See also Jack Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375, 414 (stating, "[lit is not only wrong but also incoherent for opponents of
campaign finance reform to contend that the government should not regulate access to the political process.
Government already regulates access to the political process-the first amendment simply demands that it do
so fairly."); Jamin Raskin & John Bonfaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of
Democratically FinancedElections, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1160 (1994) (advocating public funding of political
campaigns as an alternative to private contributions and spending); David A. Strauss, Corruption,Equality, and
Campaign FinanceReform, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1369, 1383 (1994) (stating that Reynolds v. Sims' "'one person,
one vote' principle contradicts the suggestion in Buckley that equalizing campaign spending speech "is foreign
to the First Amendment"); Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 291 (1992) (unfavorably
comparing Buckley to Lochner as "a decision to take the market status quo as just and prepolitical, and to use
that decision to invalidate democratic efforts at reform").
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/5
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room for some agreement among a majority of Justices on the Roberts Court (especially
with the addition of the two newest Justices, whose judicial philosophies regarding
campaign finance reform have not yet been fully formed) that would allow Buckley to
evolve into a constitutional regime equipped to address meaningfully the especially
invidious aspects of Big Money in modem politics.
The principal opinion (Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito) in Wisconsin Right to
Life provides, "Buckley's intermediate step of statutory construction on the way to its
constitutional holding does not dictate a constitutional test. The Buckley Court's
'express advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a first
principle of constitutional law.' 50 Moreover, Roberts and Alito further acknowledge
[a] second compelling interest recognized by this Court [in addition to quid pro quo
corruption] lies in addressing a "different type of corruption in the political arena: the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that51have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas."
Justice Scalia wonders in his concurring opinion about Chief Justice Roberts'
favorable quotation from McConnell that "[t]he Buckley Court's 'express advocacy
restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a first principle of
constitutional law,"' 52 stating, "I am not sure why this cryptic statement is at all relevant,
since we are discussing here the principle of constitutional law that underlay Buckley's
' 53
express-advocacy restriction."
Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts' statement is more relevant than Justice Scalia
would care to imagine. Might it provide a glimmer of insight into Justice Roberts's and
perhaps Justice Alito's willingness to recognize in a more global sense that Buckley "[is]
not [itself expressive o] ...first principle[s] of constitutional law "?54 Might not
Buckley be allowed to evolve in order to recognize the very real and corrupting effects of
massive money in politics-to address, in other words (borrowing from Austin), "'the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
...[from a variety of sources] that have little or no correlation to the public's support
55
for ...[those sources'] political ideas'?
In the final paragraph of the concurring opinion, Justice Scalia comments:

127 S. Ct. at 2669 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190). Also,
50. Wis. Right to Life 111,

[tihis court has long recognized "the [compelling] governmental interest in preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption" in election campaigns.... As Buckley explained, "[t]o the extent
that large contributions are given to secure a political quidpro quo from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined." We have
suggested that this interest might also justify limits on electioneering expenditures because it may
be that, in some circumstances, "large independent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or
apparent quidpro quo arrangements as do large contributions."
Id. at 2672 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added) (citations omitted).
51. Id.
at 2672 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
52. Id. at 2682 (Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (quoting Wis. Right to Life 111, 127 S. Ct. at
2669 n. 7).
53. Id. (emphasis in original).
127 S. Ct. at 2669 (majority) (emphasis added).
54. Wis. Right to Life 111,

& Thomas, JJ., concurring) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S at 660).
Kennedy
at 2678
(Scalia,
55. Id.
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There is wondrous irony ... [i]n the fact that the effect of BCRA has been to concentrate
more political power in the hands of the country's wealthiest individuals and their so-called
527 organization, unregulated by § 203. (In the 2004 election cycle, a mere 24 individuals
contributed an astounding total of $142 million to 527s.) And in the fact that while these
wealthy individuals dominate political discourse, it is this small, grass-roots organization

of Wisconsin Right to Life that is muzzled.

56

Is there a hint of a disparaging tone in Justice Scalia's comment that certain
"wealthy individuals" are allowed to "dominate political discourse"? 57 Perhaps it is too
much to imagine that Justice Scalia would agree that measures should be taken to lessen

the ability of "wealthy individuals [to] dominate political discourse," 58 but the point to
be taken is that all nine of the current Justices on the Supreme Court at least implicitly
recognize that the infusion of massive sums of wealth into the political process by
relatively few persons is not ideal. It is a start.
Finally, the four dissenting Justices fully see the threat, and recognize something
must be done: "Devoting concentrations of money in self-interested hands to the support
of political campaigning therefore threatens the capacity of this democracy to represent
its constituents and the confidence of its citizens in their capacity to govern
59
themselves."
C.

PreservingJudicialLegitimacy

One final thought about Wisconsin Right to Life and other post-Buckley campaign
finance cases in general. Regardless of the Supreme Court's conclusion in this or any
other constitutional matter, there is a separate question of what happens when the Court's
decisions continually fly in the face of repeated efforts by democratically-elected
branches of government, both federal and state, to enact contrary policy. To be sure, the

very principle of judicial review contemplates and accepts the Court stepping in to
enforce the Constitution against noncompliant legislative and executive acts, 6° despite

the "[c]ounter-[m]ajoritarian [d]ifficulty" 6 1 this presents. But at a certain point, when
the Court "boldly str[ikes] down the preferred policies of a coordinate branch of the

56. Id. at 2686-87 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 2687.
58. Id.
59. Wis. Right to Life Il, 127 S. Ct. at 2688-89 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
60. See e.g. Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. Dayton L.
Rev. 565, 572-73 (1996). The author states,
courts will be a great deal firmer and wiser than legislatures in interpreting constitutional guarantees
which protect essential liberty. First, judicial interpretation gives better protection to unpopular
individuals and minorities shut out of or inadequately represented in the political process. It was the
Supreme Court that spoke for the national conscience in Brown v. Board of Education, when
Congress and the President remained silent. Similarly, judicial review provides better protection
over time for enduring values which politicians too often neglect and of which the people too often
lose sight in the emotional intensity and maneuvering of political conflict. Individual liberties such
as freedom of speech and guarantees of privacy are often in this character.
Id
61. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch 16 (2d ed., Yale U. Press 1986) (coining the phrase
"[c]ounter-[m]ajoritarian [d]ifficulty" for the problem of unelected judges replacing the values of the elected
legislature with those of their own).
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/5
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national government," and stands as "a countermajoritarian obstacle to progressive
reform" as did the Lochner Court during the New Deal era, then we certainly "want to
know how and why it behaved as such an 'extremely anomalous institution from a
62
democratic point of view.'
Professor Barry Friedman suggests "the work of constitutional judges must have
[E]ven where it is possible to identify a
both 'legal' and 'social' legitimacy....
jurisprudential [legal] basis for judicial decisions, if those familiar with the Court's
decisions do not believe those decisions to be socially correct, the work of judges will be
seen as illegitimate." 63 Friedman explains:
Social legitimacy, as distinguished from legal legitimacy, looks beyond jurisprudential
antecedents of constitutional decisions and asks whether those decisions are widely
understood to be the correct ones given the social and economic milieu in which they are
rendered.

[L]egal legitimacy, at least under ordinary circumstances and with regard to constitutional
litigation, is a relatively easy test to meet. Cases rarely are litigated through the hierarchy
of trial and appellate courts with no plausible doctrinal and jurisprudential argument on the
other side. Legal legitimacy demands no more.
Standing alone, however, legal legitimacy may not suffice in the eyes of the public to
legitimate the work of constitutional judges. Judges rendering decisions that are legally
legitimate but socially unacceptable will be attacked. Moreover, the attack may well take
the form that judges are acting lawlessly.
Stated differently, strong disagreement over social legitimacy puts pressure on perceptions
of legal legitimacy. When decisions are seen as contrary to the needs of society, observers
are unlikely to concede legal legitimacy, and rest entirely upon a claim about social
propriety. Critics of the judicial decisions will attack the law as itself the problem. And,
decisions that are understood as socially illegitimate may ultimately cause the law to
64

change.

Buckley and its progeny certainly are legally legitimate. But then even those most
justifiably-vilified (DredScott, Plessy v. Ferguson,Korematsu) and unjustifiably-vilified
66
(Lochner)65 cases (as well as those most unjustifiably unvilified (Slaughter-House))

62. Keith E. Whittington, Congress before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. Rev 821, 829 (2005) (quoting
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub.
L. 279, 291 (1957). See also Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard U. Press 1977) (basing
objections to the Lochner Court on "distinctions between matters of policy, to be resolved by the legislature,
and matters of principle, to be resolved by the courts"); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong? 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 373, 375-76 (2003) (stating that its consistent nullification of the preferred policies of the elected
branches was "[t]he influential and ultimately decisive criticism of the [Lochner] Court"); Cass R. Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 874 (1987) (citing e.g. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 11 (1971)) (basing objection to the Lochner Court on
"conceptions of democracy").
63. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner,
76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1383, 1387 (2001).
64. Id. at 1387, 1455.
65. See generally, Lawrence, supra n. 7, at 8-35.
66. See generally Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporationthrough the Fourteenth
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are decided on constitutionally-plausible grounds (however thin), and are thus
technically "legal." 67 But each of them sooner or later (with the exception of SlaughterHouse-yet) were widely viewed as socially unacceptable, which led to attacks on their
legal legitimacy and ultimately to changes in the law itself as the Court repudiated its
earlier decisions.
It remains to be seen if a continued hard-adherence by the Supreme Court to
Buckley will be seen as socially unacceptable. On one hand, the fact that Congress and
the Executive have engaged in a "century-long tradition" of campaign finance reform
rarely disturbed (until recently) by the Court 68 may suggest the Court has participated in
a proper "constitutional dialogue[ ] ... [within the interstices of national politics] on
crosscutting issues that internally divide the existing lawmaking majority." 69 On the
other, if the Court's more recent post-Buckley practice of actively striking down
popularly-supported legislative campaign finance reform efforts to rein-in what is widely
perceived to be the corrupting effects of Big Money on our democratic institutions, then
the Supreme Court places its prestige and legitimacy at risk.
III.

CONCLUSION

In Wisconsin Right to Life the Supreme Court laudably preserves its robust First
Amendment doctrine in finding BCRA § 203 unconstitutional as-applied to WRTL's
pre-election advertisements. At the same time, the case highlights yet again the
pervasive conundrum posed by legislative campaign finance reform efforts: How to
reconcile the desire to protect a form of constitutionally-protected political speech while
at the same time protecting our democratic institutions from the corrosive and distorting
effects of Big Money in campaign finance. How the Court will resolve this tension
remains to be seen, but the various opinions in Wisconsin Right to Life seem to suggest
there may be some analytical room for the emergence of a coalition of Justices that will
be able to undertake the work of evolving Buckley into a socially legitimate doctrine for
the twenty-first century.

Amendment Privileges orImmunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 27-35 (2007).
67. Friedman, supran. 63, at 1453-54 (discussing Lochner):
Is it imaginable that numerous judges around the country simply began to decide cases in a lawless
fashion? They were, after all, lawyers brought up in a common law system. It is difficult to picture
them (all of them, some quite independently) deciding cases out of the blue, without reliance on
Common law judges are unlikely, under relatively
existing doctrine and jurisprudential ideas ....
ordinary circumstances and across a range of many cases, to cast the law aside in a way that we
would be willing to say the decisions were legally illegitimate.
Id.
68. 127 S. Ct. at 2697 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). See supra nn. 32-33 and
accompanying text.
69. Mark A. Graber, The Non-MajoritarianDifficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,7 Stud. Am.
Political Dev. 35, 36 (1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/5
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